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[456]1. Introduction 
 
In early 2001, Mexican soap opera star Juan Mauricio Islas entered into an exclusivity 
agreement with the Mexican based company Televisa, producer of Spanish language 
television and radio programmes for broadcast in Mexico, the United States and other 
countries. According to the agreement, which contained a governing law provision 
specifying Mexican Federal Copyright Law, Islas offered his services, including the ‘use of 
image’ and services for ‘artistic interpretation’ in certain productions, on an exclusive basis 
for a period of seven years, in return for remuneration. Notwithstanding this, at the end of 
2003, Islas signed another exclusivity agreement with Spanish language broadcasting 
company Telemundo, which was both negotiated and concluded at Telemundo’s 
headquarters in Florida. By signing this agreement with Telemundo, Islas violated his 
exclusivity agreement with Televisa. Televisa raised civil proceedings against Telemundo at 
the federal district court of Miami asserting, on the basis of Florida law, that Telemundo, as 
a third party, tortiously interfered with its contract with Islas. Televisa sought a preliminary 
injunction to prevent Telemundo from using Islas’ services throughout the duration of the 
contract and claimed damages. Telemundo, on the other hand, argued that Mexican law 
was applicable to the dispute and this did not recognise an action for tortious interference 
with contract.  
This case1 illustrates the importance of establishing which law applies to a tort claim 
for interference with another’s contract. The fact that in this instance, applying the law of 
Florida would lead to a diametrically opposite result to the outcome if Mexican law were to 
be applied, is not a coincidence. Comparative analysis in this field of law shows that 
conditions for liability vary from country to country and this may result in different 
outcomes when applied to the same set of facts.2 
Determining the applicable law in a case of interference with contractual relations 
may, however, not be easy to accomplish. Within Europe, claims arising out of tort and 
delict are generally governed by the law of the country where the damage occurs (lex loci 
damni), according to Article 4(1) of the EC Regulation on the law applicable to non-
contractual relations (hereinafter referred to as Rome II).3 However, when applying this 
provision to contract-interference cases, several questions arise from both a practical 
perspective, such as: what is the damage and how can it be localised? and from a normative 
                                                 
1
 Grupo Televisa, S.A. v. Telemundo Communications Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 1233 (C.A.11.Fla. 2007). 
2
 Some jurisdictions, including France and the Netherlands, provide comparatively broad protection to 
contracts, while others, especially England and Wales, allow a rather great deal of freedom to third parties. 
The approaches also differ: from a more flexible, multi-factor approach (e.g. the Netherlands, Germany and 
the United States), leaving room for the court to take into account the specific circumstances of the case, to a 
more closed approach with – at least on the face of it – clear-cut rules (France, England and Wales). See for an 
in-depth analysis of Dutch, German, French, English and US substantive law on the liability of third parties for 
interfering with another’s contract, L.M. van Bochove, Betrokkenheid van derden bij contractbreuk, Oisterwijk: 
Wolf Legal Publishers 2013.  
3
 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations, OJ 2007, L199/40.  
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point of view for instance: does applying the rule lead to the best result in terms of 
predictability and fairness?.  
This paper concentrates on the question of how a court should determine the 
applicable law in contract-interference cases under the Rome II Regulation. Section 2 
describes the problems the general lex loci damni-rule of Article 4(1) of the Regulation 
poses, many of which are representative of the problems that generally arise in purely 
economic loss cases – and assesses possible alternatives, including applying the exception 
provided by Article 4(3) Rome II, in favour of the ‘manifestly more closely connected law’, as 
well as the application of Article 6 Rome II, which contains a specific rule for unfair 
competition. In Section 3, a comparison is made with United States case law, which deals 
with the issue of the applicable law in cases of third party interference with contract on a 
regular basis and offers an outsider’s perspective on the issue. Finally, section 4 provides 
some points of reference for the courts.  
Given that the place of the damage, often referred to as the Erfolgsort, is relevant 
not only for establishing the applicable law pursuant to Article 4(1) Rome II, but also to 
determining whether a court has jurisdiction in a tort/delict case pursuant to Article 7(2) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation,4 the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (hereinafter 
referred to as CJEU) in respect of this provision is taken into consideration in the analysis 
which follows, particularly in Section 2.2. It should however be noted that although Rome 
II’s preamble states that the provisions of this Regulation and the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
should be consistent,5 the CJEU has emphasised [457] that the provisions of both 
regulations cannot be interpreted ‘in a manner which is unconnected to the scheme and 
objectives pursued by that regulation.’6 One notable difference between the two 
instruments is that Article 7(2) Brussels Ibis can confer jurisdiction to more than one court 
whereas Article 4(1) Rome II only refers to a single legal system.  
 
2. The law applicable to contract-interference cases pursuant to Rome II  
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
Pursuant to the general rule of Article 4(1) Rome II, the law of the country where the 
damage occurred applies to a non-contractual obligation arising out of tort/delict, 
irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and 
irrespective of the country where the indirect consequences of that event occurred. In order 
to apply this provision to cases of third party interference with contract, the first step is to 
establish what the damage resulting from the interference actually is. The second step is to 
determine whether this damage constitutes ‘damage’ in accordance with Article 4(1). If so, 
                                                 
4
 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), OJ 
2012, L 351/1.  
5
 See Recital 7 of the preamble to the Rome II Regulation.  
6
 CJEU 16 January 2014, Case C-45/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:7, NIPR 2014, 51 (Kainz v. Pantherwerke), para. 20. 
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the third step is to ascertain the place of the damage (Erfolgsort). These three steps are 
discussed further in section 2.2. Examples taken from case law are also analysed.  
 Article 4 Rome II provides two general exceptions to the lex loci damni rule. Firstly, 
should the victim and the tortfeasor have their habitual residence7 in the same country, the 
law of that country applies pursuant to Article 4(2). Furthermore, if the tort/delict is 
manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paras. (1) and 
(2), the law of that country applies pursuant to Article 4(3). Section 2.3 discusses the 
application of the latter exception in contract-interference cases.  
 Since most contract-interference cases take place in a competitive context, the 
application of Article 6 Rome II also needs to be examined. Article 6(1) Rome II, which 
provides a rule to determine the law applicable to acts of unfair competition, is considered 
in section 2.4. This provision will, however, only apply in a limited number of cases. Usually, 
the interference primarily affects the interests of one specific competitor and therefore falls 
under the scope of Article 6(2) Rome II, which refers back to Article 4 Rome II. For this 
reason, the main focus is the application of this latter provision.  
  
2.2 Place of damage 
 
2.2.1 Damage resulting from interference with contract 
 
The damage in cases of tortious interference with a contract usually8 consists of purely 
economic loss.  
 
Consider the following situation: A (habitual residence in the Netherlands) and B (habitual 
residence in Germany) conclude a contract for the sale of an antique vase for a price of 
€10,000, to be paid from B’s Swiss bank account, on delivery of the vase. According to expert 
evaluation, the appraised value of the vase is €12,500. The governing law clause in the 
contract lays down that Dutch law is applicable and the contract further stipulates that A shall 
deliver the vase to Belgium, where it will be kept temporarily for restoration. However, prior 
to the date of delivery, third party C, from his habitual residence in Italy, induces A to transfer 
the vase to him by offering him a price of €15,000 by e-mail. In addition, C promises to 
indemnify A for any future claims made by B. A receives and reads the e-mail in Spain. Upon 
his return to the Netherlands, A accepts C’s offer. A few days later, he delivers the vase to C in 
Italy, despite his contractual obligation to transfer the vase to B. As a consequence of A’s 
breach of contract, B loses the benefits of the contract, namely, not being the owner of the 
vase, which could have a monetary value estimated at €2,500 euros being the difference 
between the appraised value and the agreed purchase price. When it transpires that A has 
                                                 
7
 Habitual residence is defined in Art. 23 Rome II. The habitual residence of companies is their place of central 
administration.  
8
 Although it is not ruled out that emotional distress or reputational harm cannot be considered as 
compensable. See e.g. § 744A of the American Restatement (Second) of Torts; Cherberg v. Peoples Nat. Bank 
of Washington, 88 Wash.2d 595 (Wash. 1977); Mooney v. Johnson Cattle Co., Inc., 634 P.2d 1333 (Or. 1981). 
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disappeared and is nowhere to be found, B claims damages from C for tortiously interfering 
with his contract with A.  
 
It is clear that B has suffered no personal injury or physical damage to his (tangible) 
property. The damage sustained by B is purely economic in nature.  
 
Some German scholars have argued that in most instances of tortious interference, the 
interference does not cause any actual damage.9 They reason that the party suffering the loss, 
can usually also claim damages from his counter party, who has committed breach of 
contract. However, the fact that the victim can claim damages from his contracting party, does 
not mean that he did not suffer loss caused by the tortious behaviour of the third party. As to 
whether the tortfeasor and contracting party in breach are jointly and/or severally liable, 
constitutes another question.  
  
2.2.2 Regarding purely economic loss as ‘damage’  
 
The next step is to establish whether the damage resulting from third party interference 
with a contract constitutes ‘damage’ in terms of Article 4(1) Rome II. Despite a plethora of 
scholarship on the role of purely economic loss in substantive tort, there is no universally 
accepted definition of such loss,10 which raises the question whether it can in fact function 
as a relevant connecting factor for the determination of the applicable law.  
 In line with CJEU case law concerning Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation,11 
Rome II only differentiates between direct and indirect damage and remains silent regarding 
whether purely economic loss should also be regarded as damage within the meaning of 
Article 4(1). Recital 17 of the Rome II preamble focuses on personal injury and damage to 
property and states that the country where the damage occurs is the country where the 
injury was sustained or where the property was damaged. In these cases, related economic 
losses have to be considered as ‘indirect consequences’, which are not [458] relevant to 
establishing the law which applies.12 The question therefore remains unanswered as to what 
should be done if the damage occurred is not related to personal or physical injury or 
damage and thus is considered to be purely economic loss.  
 Persuasive arguments that purely economic loss should be considered direct damage 
in the context of Article 4(1) Rome II can be found in CJEU case law on (now) Article 7(2) of 
                                                 
9
 H. Köhler, ‘Die “Beteiligung an fremdem Vertragsbruch” – eine unerlaubte Handlung?’, in: A. Heldrich et al. 
(eds.), Festschrift für Claus-Wilhelm Canaris zum 70. Geburtstag, Band I, Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck 2007, p. 598; 
H. Koziol, Die Beeinträchtigung fremder Forderungsrechte, Vienna: Springer Verlag 1967, p. 79-80. 
10
 M. Bussani and V.V. Palmer, ‘The notion of pure economic loss and its setting’, in: M. Bussani and V.V. 
Palmer (eds.), Pure Economic Loss in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003, p. 4. 
11
 See, inter alia, ECJ 11 January 1990, Case C-220/88, ECR 1990, I-49, ECLI:EU:C:1990:8 (Dumez v. Hessische 
Landesbank); ECJ 16 July 2009, Case C-189/08, ECR 2009, I-6917, ECLI:EU:C:2009:475, NIPR 2009, 207 (Zuid-
Chemie BV v. Philippo’s Mineralenfabriek NV/SA). 
12
 J.A. Pontier, Onrechtmatige daad en andere niet-contractuele verbintenissen, Apeldoorn: Maklu 2015, no. 
247. See also, in the context of the Brussels regime, ECJ 19 September 1995, Case C-364/93, ECR 1995, I-2719, 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:289, NIPR 1995, 538 (Marinari v. Lloyd’s Bank), para. 15.  
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the Brussels Ibis Regulation. In its Kolassa judgment,13 a case concerning prospectus liability, 
the CJEU held that the purely economic damage sustained by the victim could be considered 
damage within the meaning of Article 7(2), and that the courts where the victim is domiciled 
have jurisdiction, on the basis of the place where the damage occurred, in particular when 
that damage materialises directly in the victim’s bank account held with a bank established 
within the area of jurisdiction of those courts.14 In CDC,15 the CJEU also recognised purely 
economic loss – in this case loss consisting of additional costs incurred due to artificially high 
prices caused by a cartel – as damage within the meaning of Article 7(2) and ruled that the 
place where the purely economic loss is suffered (in casu: the place of the victim’s 
registered office) was a relevant connecting factor to determine whether or not a court has 
jurisdiction.16  
  More recently, the CJEU ruled on the topic of purely economic loss in the case of 
Universal Music,17 again in relation to the matter of jurisdiction. The facts of the case were 
as follows.  
 
In 1998, Universal Music International Ltd. (part of the Universal Music Group) and Czech 
record company B&M agreed upon the purchase of 70 per cent of the shares of B&M by 
companies within the Universal Music Group. Furthermore, parties agreed that in 2003, 
Universal would buy the remaining 30 per cent. In the draft version of the Letter of Intent, 
the intended purchase price for all shares equalled five times the annual profit of B&M. For 
the drafting of the definitive share option agreement for 30 per cent of the shares, the 
Universal Music Group instructed a Czech law firm, Burns Schwartz International. On 5 
November 1998, a share option agreement was entered into by Universal Music 
International Holding B.V. (hereinafter referred to as Universal Music), registered in the 
Netherlands, B&M and its shareholders. However, due to an alleged error on the part of an 
employee of Burns Schwartz International whilst drafting the agreement, the price Universal 
Music were required to pay for the shares was increased dramatically. In 2003, Universal 
Music bought, as agreed, the remaining 30 per cent of the shares. It calculated, on the basis 
of the intended purchase price, that it should pay approximately €313,000. B&M’s 
shareholders, however, calculated the price of the shares on the basis of the formula in the 
final agreement, resulting in a purchase price of more than €30 million. Parties went to 
arbitration and in 2005, Universal Music and B&M’s shareholders settled their dispute for 
€2.6 million. Thereafter, Universal Music commenced legal proceedings against Burns 
Schwartz International and its employee before the court of Utrecht in the Netherlands. It 
sought the amount of €2.7 million, this being the difference between the intended price of 
the shares and the settlement sum reached plus the costs for the arbitration proceedings 
and the settlement.  
 
                                                 
13
 CJEU 28 January 2015, Case C-375/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:37, NIPR 2015, 50. 
14
 Idem, para. 55.  
15
 CJEU 21 May 2015, Case C-352/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:335, NIPR 2015, 292. 
16
 Idem, para. 52. 
17
 CJEU 16 June 2016, Case C-12/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:449. 
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It was beyond doubt that the place where the event giving rise to the damage took place 
was the Czech Republic. The parties however did not agree with the determination of the 
place where the damage occurred. Although payment of €2.6 million was made from 
Universal Music’s Dutch bank account, the CJEU conclusively held that the damage, which 
was purely economic, not physical, also occurred in the Czech Republic:  
 
‘The damage for Universal Music resulting from the difference between the intended sale 
price and the price in that contract became certain in the course of the settlement agreed 
between the parties before the arbitration board, in the Czech Republic, on 31 January 2005, 
the date on which the actual sale price was fixed. Therefore, the obligation to pay placed an 
irreversible burden on Universal Music’s assets. […] Accordingly, the loss of some assets 
happened in the Czech Republic, the damage having occurred there.’
 18
 
 
Thus, the place where the purely economic loss occurred, in so far as it was directly linked to 
the harmful event, qualifies as Erfolgsort and thus constitutes a ground for jurisdiction.19 
The next question is, the extent to which this reasoning in the context of jurisdiction is 
relevant to establishing the law applicable to claims for tortious interference with contract. 
As aforementioned, the provisions of the Rome II Regulation should in principle be 
consistent with those of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, but this does not mean that 
consistency should be achieved no matter what. It seems, however, unlikely that to consider 
direct, purely economic loss as ‘damage’ in terms of Article 4(1) Rome II would be contrary 
to either the scheme of the Rome II Regulation, or to its objectives to enhance the 
foreseeability of court decisions and to ensure a reasonable balance between the interests 
of the person claimed to be liable and the person who has sustained damage.20 The fact that 
neither Article 4(1) nor the preamble specify any limitations as to the type of damage, is 
supportive of this view.21  
 In conclusion, pure economic loss should be recognised as ‘damage’ within the 
meaning of Article 4(1) Rome II. Determining the place of damage in contract-interference 
cases, however, is a different question. 
  
2.2.3 Determining the place of damage in contract-interference cases 
 
Lehmann has argued that when applying the lex loci damni-rule of Article 4(1) Rome II to 
purely economic loss cases, one must differentiate between certain fact patterns, since 
                                                 
18
 Idem, paras. 31-32.  
19
 See also M.H. ten Wolde and K.C. Henckel, ‘The ECJ’s interpretation of Article 5(3) Brussels I Regulation: a 
carefully balanced system of jurisdictional rules?’, International Journal of Procedural Law 2013-2, p. 220. It 
should be noted that in Universal Music the place of damage did not constitute an additional ground of 
jurisdiction, since the Czech Republic was also the Handlungsort.   
20
 See Recital 16 of the preamble to the Regulation. 
21
 See also L. Strikwerda in his case note on Kolassa in Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2015, 332, no. 6; Pontier 
2015, no. 249 (supra n. 12).  
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economic loss cannot be located by a geographical one-size-fits-all rule. 22 Hence, the next 
step is to determine where the damage occurs in the case of tortious interference with 
contract. In the example case involving the sale of the vase, in section 2.2.1, the following 
potential loci damni can be identified: [459] (i) Spain: the place where the seller A receives 
third party C’s persuasive statements to conclude an ‘inconsistent transaction’; (ii) the 
Netherlands: the place where A decides to conclude the inconsistent transaction with C; (iii) 
the place where A and C conclude their contract. This is difficult to determine in cases of 
distant contracting; (iv) Belgium: the place where the contractual obligation towards first 
buyer B should have been performed, but was not; (v) Italy: the place where the actual 
delivery to C took place; (vi) Switzerland: the place where B holds his bank account; (vii) 
Germany: the place where B has his domicile and feels the impact of the loss.  
 To establish where the initial damage took place, the ‘reversibility test’ may be 
useful. This test, which is sometimes used in cases of misrepresentation,23 entails that the 
relevant damage occurs when the negative consequences of the wrongful act are no longer 
reversible.  
 
The reversibility test is also referred to by the CJEU in the Universal Music judgment, when 
the Court stated that the obligation to pay, arising from the settlement agreed between the 
parties, ‘placed an irreversible burden on Universal Music’s assets’24 in the Czech Republic, 
thus making the Czech Republic the Erfolgsort.  
 
Based on this test, the receipt of the information (i) cannot be regarded as relevant.25 
Option (ii) and (iii) can be disregarded for the same reason given that A still has an 
opportunity to fulfil its contractual obligations towards B (that is, if he breaches his contract 
with C).  
 In view of CJEU’s ruling in Universal Music, the place where the victim has his bank 
account (option vi) and the place where the victim has his domicile/habitual residence 
(option vii) should not, in itself, be regarded as the place where the (initial) damage 
occurred.26 With regard to option (vii), the CJEU, referring to the Kronhofer judgment,27 held 
that the notion of place where the harmful event occurred (more particularly the place 
where the damage occurs) in (now) Article 7(2) Brussels Ibis Regulation ‘does not refer to 
the place where the applicant [victim, LvB] is domiciled and where his assets are 
concentrated by reason of the fact that he has suffered financial damage there resulting 
                                                 
22
 M. Lehmann, ‘Where Does Economic Loss Occur?’ JPIL 2011-3, p. 549. This is also evident from the case law 
on Art. 7(2) Brussels Ibis Regulation, see supra, 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.  
23
 A. Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation. The law applicable to non-contractual obligations, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2008, p. 328. 
24
 CJEU Universal Music, para. 31 (supra n. 17).  
25
 See also Lehmann 2011, p. 536 (supra n. 22), who argues that even in cases of misleading information the 
receipt of information ‘in and of itself is not damage’.  
26
 CJEU Universal Music, para. 38 (supra n. 17). This was different in CJEU Kolassa (supra n. 13) and CJEU CDC 
(supra n. 15) where the other circumstances also contributed to attributing jurisdiction to the courts for the 
place where a purely economic loss occurred.  
27
 ECJ 10 June 2004, Case C-168/02, ECR 2002, I-6009, ECLI:EU:C:2004:364, NIPR 2004, 249. 
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from the loss of part of his assets which arose and was incurred in another Member State’.28 
This is in keeping with previous case law in which the CJEU has repeatedly ruled that Article 
7(2) Brussels Ibis Regulation does not aim to create a forum actoris for tort victims.29 
Furthermore, the Court held in Universal Music that ‘purely financial damage which occurs 
directly to the applicant’s bank account cannot, in itself, be sufficient to constitute a 
“relevant connecting factor”,’30 for establishing the jurisdiction of the court for the place 
where the damage occurred. The CJEU argued that this place, in itself, is not necessarily the 
most reliable connecting factor since a company may have multiple bank accounts.31 The 
fact that Universal Music’s bank account and domicile were both located in the Netherlands, 
was insufficient to regard the Netherlands as the Erfolgsort.  
 At first glance, Universal Music may seem difficult to reconcile with the CJEU’s 
previous judgments in Kolassa and CDC. In Kolassa, the Court ruled that in certain 
circumstances, the jurisdiction of the court for the Erfolgsort is attributed to the court 
situated in the victim’s domicile if he suffered pure financial loss to his bank account held 
within a bank established within the jurisdiction of this court.32 In CDC, a case regarding 
purely economic damage caused by a hydrogen peroxide cartel, the CJEU held that the 
Erfolgsort should be located at the victim’s registered office.33 These judgments are 
however rooted in the particular features of those cases. In Kolassa, the bank had published 
a prospectus in the country where the victim, a consumer, was domiciled and held his bank 
account.34 In CDC, a large number of people had been harmed and it was not possible to 
identify one single place as the location of the causal event. Additionally, locating the 
Erfolgsort at the place of the company’s registered office could be justified by the fact that 
usually, a company conducts its economic activities at its registered office.35 In Universal 
Music however, it seems that the CJEU regarded the financial damage suffered by the victim 
in his bank account at the place of his domicile as indirect damage, following from the loss 
of assets, which was the initial damage, which was sustained in the Czech Republic.36  
 The two remaining options are the place where the contractual obligation would 
have been performed except for the interference (in casu: non-delivery in Belgium) (iv), and 
                                                 
28
 CJEU Universal Music, para. 35 (supra n. 17).  
29
 ECJ Dumez (supra n. 11). See also Ten Wolde and Henckel 2013, p. 218 (supra n. 19). 
30
 CJEU Universal Music, para. 38 (supra n. 17).  
31
 Idem. 
32
 CJEU Kolassa, para. 55 (supra n. 13). This case has received much attention in literature, see, inter alia, 
T.M.C. Arons, ‘On financial losses, prospectuses, liability, jurisdiction (clauses) and applicable law. European 
Court of Justice 28 January 2015, Case C-375/13 (Kolassa/Barclays Bank)’, NIPR 2015, p. 377-382; M. Lehmann, 
‘Prospectus Liability and Private International Law - Assessing the Landscape after the CJEU Kolassa Ruling 
(Case C-375/13)’, JPIL 2016-2, p. 318-343. See also M. Haentjens and D.J. Verheij, ‘Finding Nemo: Locating 
Financial Losses after Kolassa and Profit’, Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 2016, p. 358, 
arguing that the Court was incorrect to refer to the place of the bank account and should have taken the place 
of the securities account into consideration instead. 
33
 CJEU CDC, para. 52 (supra n. 15). 
34
 See Conclusion A-G Szpunar to Case C-12/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:161, para. 45.  
35
 Idem, para. 47.  
36
 Cf. ECJ Kronhofer (supra n. 27).  
10 
 
the place where the actual performance of the conflicting contractual obligation took place 
(in casu: delivery of the vase to third party C in Italy) (v).  
 Option (iv) was adopted in the Dolphin case,37 in which the English Queen’s Bench 
Division (Commercial Court) held that claims for inducing a breach of contract fell within the 
scope of Article 5(3) Brussels I Regulation (now Article 7(2) Brussels Ibis Regulation) and that 
the place where the damage occurred is the place where the victim should have received his 
contractual entitlement be that, money or goods.38 Although [460] locating the damage at 
the place where the contractual obligation should have been performed appears to be 
sensible, it is perhaps questionable whether this option is fully reconcilable with Rome II’s 
overall objective of enhancing the foreseeability of court decisions.39 Article 7(1) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, which provides the option for the plaintiff to bring proceedings 
concerning contractual matters at the place where the contract was performed or ought to 
have been performed, shows that the identification of the place of performance of a 
contractual obligation can be problematic, especially for obligations not yet performed, 
provided that the contract does not stipulate the place of performance. In that case, the 
court should determine the place of performance on the basis of the law applicable to the 
contract.40 This particular issue has led to a large number of CJEU rulings,41 and is the main 
reason why Article 7(1) is considered one of the most complex provisions of the Brussels Ibis 
                                                 
37
 [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 473. 
38
 See also P. Stone, EU Private International Law, Cheltenham: Elgar European Law 2014, p. 103, who also 
claims that the place of injury is the place ‘where under the contract the relevant payment or other benefit 
should have been received by the plaintiff’. At p. 381, within the context of Rome II, he argues that the country 
of direct injury is the country ‘in which the breach induced occurred and the plaintiff suffered direct financial 
loss (for example, by failing to receive a benefit contracted for)’. 
39
 See Recital 16 of the preamble to the Regulation.  
40
 ECJ 6 October 1976, Case 12/76, ECR 1976, III-1473, ECLI:EU:C:1976:133 (Tessili v. Dunlop). 
41
 The first cases were ECJ Tessili v. Dunlop (supra n. 40) and ECJ 6 October 1976, Case 14/76, ECR 1976, III-
1497, ECLI:EU:C:1976:134 (De Bloos v. Bouyer) (ruling, also on the basis of Art. 5(1) Brussels Convention 1968, 
that the court has to identify the contractual right on which the plaintiff’s claim is based and determine the 
place of performance of that specific right). To enhance legal certainty, the EU legislator introduced a new 
provision for sales and services contracts in the Brussels I Regulation 2001 (Art. 5(1)(b), now Art. 7(1)(b) 
Brussels Ibis), which contains an autonomous place of performance for these types of contracts. Yet, the new 
provision did not put an end to the influx of preliminary questions on the forum contractus rule, see, inter alia, 
ECJ 3 May 2007, Case C-396/05, ECR 2007 I-3699, ECLI:EU:C:2007:262, NIPR 2007, 127 (Color Drack) (on 
multiple places of delivery), CJEU 25 February 2010, Case C-381/08, ECR 2010, I-1255, ECLI:EU:C:2010:90, NIPR 
2010, 194 (Car Trim v. KeyStafety) (considering the situation where parties did not determine a place of 
delivery in their agreement); CJEU 9 June 2011, Case C-87/10, ECR 2011, I-4987, ECLI:EU:C:2011:375, NIPR 
2011, 346 (Electrosteel) (on considering standard stipulations in contracts such as INCOTERMS). See also, inter 
alia, H. Duintjer Tebbens, ‘Jurisdiction and Enforcement in International Contract Law (Selected Aspects of the 
Brussels Convention of 1968/1978), in: P. Sarcevic (ed.), International Contracts and Conflicts of Laws; A 
Collection of Essays, Londen: Graham and Trotman 1990, p. 124-150; H. van Lith, International Jurisdiction and 
Commercial Litigation (PhD thesis Rotterdam), The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 2009, p. 88 ff.; U. Grušić, 
‘Jurisdiction in Complex Contracts under the Brussels I Regulation’, JPIL 2011(2), p. 321-340; R. Fentiman, 
International Commercial Litigation, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015, nos. 9.45 ff.; P. Mankowski, ‘Article 
7’, in: U. Magnus and P. Mankowski, European Commentaries on Private International Law, Volume I, Brussels 
Ibis Regulation, Cologne: Otto Schmidt 2016, nos. 139 ff.  
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Regulation.42 Moreover, the place of performance in terms of the contract which has been 
interfered with, may be coincidental and only slightly connected to the tort (such as the 
delivery of the vase to Belgium in the example detailed above).  
 One could argue that damage for B becomes irreversible at the moment when party 
A delivers the vase to third party C (option v), since from that moment on, A is no longer in a 
position to deliver the vase to B. There is however a major objection to the place of actual 
performance in that it gives rise to a real possibility for the tortfeasor to manipulate the law 
applicable to the tort. A and C could effectively agree upon a place of delivery in a country 
with a relatively high threshold for liability for interference with contract, with the aim of 
reducing B’s chances for a successful claim against C.  
 In conclusion, none of these options provide a fully conclusive yardstick to locate the 
place of damage in contract-interference cases. In my view, the place of performance of the 
obligation interfered with (option iv) is the one that comes closest however only in the 
context of relatively straightforward transactions, provided that the place of performance 
can be easily identified. For contracts involving multiple rights and obligations and/or 
obligations for which the place of performance is difficult to establish, this approach will not 
suffice and an alternative solution should be sought.  
 
2.2.4 Place of damage according to domestic case law 
 
The difficulties related to establishing the Erfolgsort in cases of third party interference with 
contract are also demonstrated in domestic case law in point. The first case to be discussed, 
AMT Futures Ltd v. Marzillier, Dr Meier & Dr Gunter Rechtsantwaltsgesellschaft MbH 
(hereinafter referred to as AMTF v. MMGR),43 was heard by the English Court of Appeal in 
2015.  
 
The case concerns the inducement of a breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause. AMTF, an 
English financial services provider, had concluded a number of agreements with its clients to 
trade in derivatives on their behalf. Each of the agreements contained an exclusive forum 
clause nominating the English courts. In some cases, clients incurred losses on their trades and 
about 70 of them instigated proceedings against AMTF in Germany. According to AMTF, the 
German proceedings were induced by MMGR, a German legal firm. AMTF raised a civil claim 
for damages in the English court for inducement of breach of contract, namely, violation of 
the choice of forum clause. Moreover, it sought injunctive relief to prevent future 
inducement.  
 
The central issue was whether or not the English court had jurisdiction pursuant to the 
Brussels I Regulation. Since the defendant (third party) did not have its domicile in England, 
the English court could not accept jurisdiction on the basis of Article 2 of the Brussels I 
                                                 
42
 See M. Lehmann, ‘Special Jurisdiction. Matters Relating to Contract’, in: A. Dickinson and E. Lein (eds.), The 
Brussels I Regulation Recast, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015, no. 4.31.  
43
 [2015] 3 WLR 282.  
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Regulation (now Article 4 Brussels Ibis) (forum rei). The court had to consider whether it had 
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (now 7(2) Brussels Ibis). 
Since the event giving rise to the damage (the inducement) had not taken place in England, 
the English court could only accept jurisdiction if England was the place where the damage 
occurred. The alleged damage consisted of (a) money paid in settlements (51 out of 70 cases 
were settled), (b) legal costs incurred in Germany and England, (c) loss of management time, 
and (d) loss of profit in respect of future contracts.  
 The court of first instance had ruled that England was indeed the Erfolgsort. It 
referred to the above-mentioned Dolphin case,44 according to which, the damage occurs at 
the place where the contractual entitlement ought to have been received. In the court’s 
view, this reasoning could also rightfully be applied to exclusive jurisdiction clauses. MMGR 
however argued that, contrary to the Dolphin case, the present case concerned a negative 
contractual obligation, namely the obligation not to start proceedings anywhere else than in 
England. [461] There was, however, no positive obligation to litigate in England. If 
proceedings had not been brought, there would not have been a breach of an obligation. 
The court, however, did not accept this contention. It held that the English party was 
entitled to decide any disputes falling under the scope of the forum clause in England. 
Therefore, England was the place where the contractual benefit should have been enjoyed, 
‘just as much as would be deprivation of a money sum which fell to be paid in England, or 
goods which fell to be delivered in England.’45 An alternative submission that AMTF had 
suffered damage in England because it had to pay settling expenses and costs of defending 
from England was however rejected. The court ruled that the expense caused by litigation 
occurred in Germany, since it consisted of costs for instructing German lawyers and court 
fees, as well as payments of settlements which were concluded in Germany. Moreover, loss 
of wasted management time and loss of business were not taken into account since the 
court considered them ‘merely the remoter financial consequences of the harm suffered in 
Germany.’46  
 The Court of Appeal presented a different view. It started by concluding that on the 
basis of the CJEU case law, Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation ‘plainly’ permits taking 
account of purely economic damage.47 The court continued by stating that the question 
whether the relevant obligation required to do or to not do something was not a crucial 
factor. The key issue was ‘where in reality AMTF suffered the damage which formed the 
basis of its tortious claim.’48 The court then determined the harm suffered by AMTF by 
comparing the current situation with the situation if there had not been an inducement of a 
breach of the forum clause, namely, if proceedings had not been started in Germany. The 
Court of Appeal distinguished between ‘initial damage’ and ‘subsequent’ or ‘remote’ 
damage. It held that Germany was the place where the initial damage comprising the cost 
                                                 
44
 Supra n. 37. 
45
 [2015] 2 WLR 187, 207. 
46
 Idem, at 208. 
47
 AMTF v. MMGR, at 297 (supra n. 43). 
48
 Idem. 
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and expense incurred by litigation, the payment of court fees, the instructing of German 
lawyers etc. had occurred. The fact that AMTF felt the impact of the damage in England, was 
not considered relevant since the damage occurred in Germany.49  
 In 2013, the Dutch Gerechtshof ’s-Hertogenbosch (Court of Appeal) had to establish 
the Erfolgsort in a case of (indirect) interference with an exclusive distribution contract, also 
for the purposes of jurisdiction.50  
 
The case concerned a Dutch plaintiff, who had concluded an agreement with the Dutch 
company Armas, which gave the plaintiff the right to distribute self-tanning products by the 
brand Australian Gold exclusively in the territory of the Benelux. Notwithstanding the 
plaintiff’s exclusive distribution right, a German company started offering Australian Gold 
tanning products in the Benelux. The plaintiff then commenced proceedings against Armas for 
breach of contract, asserting that Armas had not taken measures to prevent the German party 
from selling the products in the Benelux, and against the German company for knowingly 
taking advantage of this breach. The Court of Appeal had to determine whether the Dutch 
court had jurisdiction in relation to the claim against the German defendant. The plaintiff 
argued that the Dutch court had jurisdiction on the basis of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation (now Article 7(2) Brussels Ibis), since the damage had occurred in the Netherlands. 
 
The Court of Appeal had to determine which place qualified as the Erfolgsort. As described 
in the previous section, several options were available. The court could, for instance, have 
equated the place of damage with the place of performance of the contractual obligation 
(indirectly) interfered with. In that case, it would have needed to establish where, according 
to the contract, Armas was obliged to take action against the German party. This could, 
however, have been a difficult undertaking.  
 The Court of Appeal opted for a different approach. It ruled that the initial damage 
was suffered in the Netherlands since the defendant offered products in the Netherlands 
notwithstanding the plaintiff’s right to distribute these products exclusively in the Benelux. 
Then, the Court of Appeal referred to the Wintersteiger case,51 in which the CJEU ruled that 
in the case of a violation of an intellectual property right, the Erfolgsort is located in the 
Member State of registration. Applying this reasoning to exclusive distribution, it ruled that 
the Dutch court had jurisdiction in relation to the damage sustained due to the fact that the 
plaintiff’s exclusive right to distribute the goods in the Netherlands had been disrespected. 
By contrast, it did not accept jurisdiction in relation to damage suffered in Belgium and 
Luxembourg. Even though its argumentation does not seem fully conclusive – unlike 
Wintersteiger, this case did not concern the infringement of an intellectual property right – 
there is strong case to be made for the Court of Appeal’s decision not to consider the place 
of performance of the breached obligation. It is clear that the plaintiff suffered damage in 
the Netherlands, where he experienced diminishing sales due to the defendant’s acts. 
                                                 
49
 Idem, at 298. 
50
 Gerechtshof ’s-Hertogenbosch 26 November 2013, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2013:5658, NTHR 2014(1), p. 29.  
51
 CJEU 19 April 2012, Case C-523/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:220, NIPR 2012, 350.  
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Although this case concerned a third party knowingly taking advantage of a breach of 
contract, rather than actively interfering with the contract, it is likely that the same 
reasoning would have been followed if the third party had induced the breach of contract. 
 
2.3 Manifestly closer connection 
 
Article 4(3) Rome II contains an escape clause in favour of the law of the country ‘manifestly 
more closely connected’ with the tort.52 This clause is narrow in scope. The word 
‘manifestly’ as well as the Explanatory Memorandum make clear that this provision may 
only be applied by way of exception and should be subject to strict interpretation.53 
Furthermore, Article 4(3) states that a manifestly closer connection might be based on a 
‘pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a contract’. It is questionable 
whether, in a case of tortious interference with contract, the contract interfered with can be 
qualified as such. If this were to be the case, the claim against the third party who interfered 
with the contract, would be governed by the same law as the claim against the party in 
breach. In the example of the sale of the vase in Section 2.2.1, [462] this would be Dutch 
law, in accordance with Art. 3(1) Rome I Regulation.54  
It is, prima facie, unlikely that the contract interfered with could be qualified as such. 
This contract was not, after all, concluded between the tortfeasor and the victim. Yet, the 
requirement that the pre-existing relationship should be between the parties has to be put 
into perspective. In the view of Kramer and Verhagen this condition can be disregarded in 
the case of multiple tortfeasors.55 They argue that, in situations of joint tortfeasance, there 
can be reasons to apply the law applicable to the prime tortfeasor’s non-contractual 
obligation to the tort(s) of the additional tortfeasor(s). Can this line of reasoning be 
extrapolated to cases of tortious interference?  
English law suggests that the answer might be in the affirmative. According to 
English case law,56 inducement of a breach of contract is an instance of ‘secondary’ or 
‘accessory liability’, in which the party in breach is considered the prime ‘wrongdoer’, and 
the inducer the secondary wrongdoer. The so-called ‘secondary civil liability theory’ follows 
the same pattern as the doctrine of joint tortfeasance.57 Hence, one could argue that 
                                                 
52
 See on the problem related to the interpretation of the word ‘manifestly’ R. Fentiman, ‘The Significance of 
Close Connection’, in: J. Ahern and W. Binchy, The Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-
Contractual Obligations. A New International Litigation Regime, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009, 
p. 103-105. At p. 112, Fentiman argues that the exception included in Art. 4(3) is of limited significance and 
might even be unnecessary.  
53
 See also X.E. Kramer, ‘The Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations: The 
European private international law tradition continued’, NIPR 2008-4, p. 422; Dickinson 2008, p. 340 (supra n. 
23). See on the interpretation of the word ‘manifestly’: R. Fentiman 2009, p. 103-105 (supra n. 52).  
54
 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations, OJ 2008, L 177/6.  
55
 X.E. Kramer and H.L.E. Verhagen, Mr. C. Assers Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk 
Recht. Internationaal privaatrecht, Deel III Internationaal vermogensrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2015, no. 1015. 
56
 OBG v. Allan [2008] 1 AC 1, 27, 59.  
57
 H. Carty, An Analysis of the Economic Torts, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010, p. 305. 
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pursuant to Article 4(3) Rome II, the law applicable to the contractual obligation of the 
primary wrongdoer should also apply to the non-contractual obligation of the secondary 
wrongdoer.58  
 It should be noted that English law occupies an exceptional position within the EU 
and care should be taken to avoid attaching too much weight to this, especially in view of 
the forthcoming ‘Brexit’. Most EU jurisdictions consider the inducer’s liability as non-
derivative in nature, independent of the liability of the party in breach, which makes it less 
convincing to apply the law applicable to the contract interfered with, as the manifestly 
more closely connected law. From the perspective of legal certainty and harmonisation, 
Article 4(3) Rome II has to be interpreted autonomously, by making reference to the 
objectives and scheme of the Regulation and to the general principles underlying the 
national legal systems as a whole and without referring to a specific national law, be it the 
lex fori or the lex causae.59 Since the majority of EU Member States does not regard the 
liability of the third party as accessory or secondary in nature, there appears to be no strong 
case for classifying the contract interfered with as a ‘pre-existing relationship between the 
parties’. This view is also in line with Dutch case law.60  
 This does not, however, detract from the fact that, highly depending on the fact 
pattern specific to the case, it is still possible to apply another law than the lex loci damni if 
it is manifestly more closely connected to the tort.  
 
2.4 Market-effects rule 
 
Article 6 of the Rome II Regulation contains specific conflict-of-law rules for acts of unfair 
competition and acts restricting free competition.61 Since situations of contract-interference 
often take place within the competitive context, it is necessary to explore this provision 
further.  
 Pursuant to Article 6(1) Rome II, non-contractual obligations arising out of an act of 
unfair competition are governed by the law of the country where competitive relations or 
the collective interests of consumers are, or are likely to be, affected. Its purpose is to 
protect fair competition ‘by obliging all participants to play the game by the same rules’.62 
This provision should be considered as a clarification of, rather than an exception to, the lex 
                                                 
58
 In AMTF v. MMGR (supra n. 43), Christopher Clarke LJ seems to back this view when stating that ‘there is 
much to be said for the determination of what is in essence an ancillary claim in tort for inducement of breach 
of contract to be made in the court which the contract breaker agreed should have exclusive jurisdiction in 
respect of that contract’. Although he continued by asserting that ‘the governing law of the relationship 
between the former clients and AMTF […] is not a determining factor in the allocation of jurisdiction under the 
[Brussels I] Regulation’, the suggestion is made that this could be different for the determination of the 
applicable law. 
59
 See also Pontier 2015, nos. 198-200, and – on autonomous interpretation in general – no. 10 (supra n. 12).  
60
 See Rechtbank Utrecht 8 February 2012, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2012:BW1631, para. 3.11, on the basis of Art. 5 of 
the (then applicable) Dutch Conflict of Laws (Torts) Act, which resembled Art. 4(3) Rome II.  
61
 The latter ones, including violations with antitrust law, fall under the scope of Art. 6(3) Rome II and can be 
disregarded for this paper. 
62
 Commission proposal, COM(2003) 427 final, p. 15.  
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loci damni rule of Article 4(1) Rome II.63 Indeed, it is difficult to think of situations in which 
the application of Article 6(1) would lead to fundamentally different outcomes than the 
application of Article 4(1).64 Nevertheless, pursuant to Article 6(2) Rome II, the applicable 
law shall be determined on the basis of Article 4 Rome II when an act of unfair competition 
exclusively affects the interests of a specific competitor, which suggests that Article 6(1) and 
Article 4 can produce different results.65 The main difference between Article 6(1) and 
Article 4 seems, however, that the exceptions in favour of the law of the common habitual 
residence66 and the manifestly more closely connected law,67 which are ruled out in relation 
to Article 6(1), are reinstated. Moreover, it is assumed that in situations falling within the 
scope of Article 6(2), the opportunity for parties to choose the applicable law within the 
boundaries set by Article 14 is also resurrected, which is excluded in relation to Article 
6(1).68 
 Most contract-interference cases will fall within the scope of Article 6(2) Rome II.69 
Although it is not ruled out that there may be a public interest involved,70 usually, the 
interference [463] will primarily affect the interests of one specific competitor, which 
validates applying Article 6(2) in conjunction with Article 4 (and 14) Rome II.71 There are 
however, situations conceivable in which interference with another’s contract violates the 
interests of others as much, or even more than, the interests of the party whose contractual 
rights have been infringed.  
                                                 
63
 Recital 21 of the preamble to the Regulation. See also C. Wadlow, ‘The new private international law of 
unfair competition and the “Rome II” Regulation’, 4 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 2009(11), p. 
794, who argues that it is difficult to think of situations in which the application of Art. 6(1) Rome II would lead 
to fundamentally different outcomes than the application of Art. 4(1) Rome II.  
64
 Wadlow 2009, p. 794 (supra n. 63).  
65
 See Dickinson 2008, p. 397 (supra n. 23).  
66
 Art. 4(2) Rome II. 
67
 Art. 4(3) Rome II.  
68
 See also Dickinson 2008, p. 426 (supra n. 23); G. Wagner, ‘Die neue Rom II-Verordnung’, IPRax 2008, p. 8; 
T. Rosenkranz and E. Rohde, ‘The law applicable to non-contractual obligations arising out of acts of unfair 
competition and acts restricting free competition under Article 6 Rome II Regulation’, NIPR 2008-4, p. 438; S.J. 
Schaafsma, ‘Rome II: intellectuele eigendom en oneerlijke concurrentie’, WPNR 2008/6780, p. 1002.  
69
 In its proposal, the Commission mentions enticing a competitor’s employees and inducing a breach of 
contract –which can both be regarded as instances of third party interference with contract – as examples of 
acts falling under the scope of Art. 6(2). See Commission proposal, p. 16 (supra n. 62). 
70
 See J. Drexl, in: Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, Internationales Recht gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 
Munich: Beck 2015, no. 159, arguing that in cases concerning the enticing of employees the stability and 
operation of the labour market as a whole are at stake. 
71
 The Commission also acknowledges that it cannot be ruled out completely that acts falling under the scope 
of Art. 6(2) also have a negative impact on the market, see Commission proposal, p. 16 (supra n. 62). See 
however Drexl 2015, no. 154 (supra n. 70), who argues that the exception of Art. 6(2) Rome II should be more 
narrowly construed, and should only encompass those situations in which the interests of one competitor are 
immediately violated, without the intervention of another party. In his opinion, situations of inducement of a 
breach of contract or the enticing of employees do not fall within the scope of Art. 6(2); the applicable law 
should be determined on the basis of Art. 6(1) Rome II. See also BGH 11 February 2010, GRUR 2010, 847, in 
which German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), on the basis of the German conflict-of-law rules, ruled that in a 
case of commercial disparagement, the market-effects rule had to be applied, instead of the law of the country 
of the parties’ common habitual residence. The BGH stated that the result would have been the same under 
the Rome II Regulation, which was not yet temporarily applicable.  
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Suppose car manufacturer B, having its head office in Germany, sets up a selective 
distribution system for the Netherlands, by concluding contracts with a limited number of 
car dealers, including A, seated in the Netherlands. In order to be permitted to sell the cars, 
the dealers should meet certain requirements regarding the services they provide to 
customers, the design of their showroom, etc. Moreover, they are only allowed to sell the 
cars to end users. Car dealer C, who does not belong to B’s selective distribution network in 
the Netherlands, and is seated in country Germany, induces dealer A to breach its contract 
with B. In violation with his contractual obligations towards B, A sells and delivers cars to C, 
making it possible for C to resell the cars on the Dutch market, without being obliged to 
meet the conditions set by B. Because of this, C has less expenditure related to the car sales 
compared to the affiliated group members of the selective distribution network, which 
provides C with a competitive advantage. Although B, whose contract has been breached, 
has an interest in maintaining his selective distribution network – with C’s inducement 
potentially leading to its disintegration if network members decide to cancel or terminate 
their contracts – the inducement first and foremost affects the affiliated car dealers who 
immediately experience a competitive disadvantage.  
 
In this type of case, which clearly involves the interests of more than one competitor, it 
appears more appropriate to adhere to the application of the market-effects rule of Article 
6(1) Rome II. In this example, this would lead the law of the country where the distribution 
network is affected (here the Netherlands) being applied, irrespective of any common 
habitual residence of the parties or a manifestly closer connection with another country. 
 
3. Comparison with US conflict of laws 
 
3.1 Various approaches  
 
In the United States, conflict of laws falls under state law, which means that, within the 
limitations of the US Constitution,72 states are free to adopt their own rules in respect of this 
matter, resulting in different variations in rules from state to state.73 Conflict-of-law rules 
are mostly embodied in common law rules rather than in statutes or treaties.74 Observing 
US case law shows that several approaches are used by state and by federal75 courts to 
determine the law that applies to cases of tortious interference with contractual relations. 
This includes governmental interest analysis which means applying the law of the state 
which has the most significant interest in seeing its substantive law applied to the case,76 
                                                 
72
 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, Chapter 1. Introduction, § 2, comment b.  
73
 See also S.C. Symeonides, ‘The American choice-of-law revolution in the courts: today and tomorrow’, 
Recueil des Cours 2002, p. 27 ff.  
74
 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, Chapter 1. Introduction, § 5, comment c. 
75
 Federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction have to apply the conflict-of-law rules of the forum state to 
determine the applicable law, see Bigio v. Coco-Cola Co., 675 F.3d 163, 169 (C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2012).  
76
 E.g. Discover Group, Inc. v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 333 F.Supp.2d 78 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), in which the court held 
that in a tort claim, ‘New York applies the “greater interest test,” under which “controlling effect is given to the 
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the lex loci damni rule77 and the lex loci delicti commissi rule, which refers to the law of the 
place where the tort was committed.78 In addition, some courts have considered the 
contents of laws which could potentially be applicable, and have made comparisons in order 
to determine what the applicable law will be.79 For the purposes of this paper however, it 
seems opportune to concentrate on the most significant relationship test, which is used by 
US courts rather often.80 This test is also considered to be the general principle for the 
determination of the law applicable to torts in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
(hereinafter referred to as Restatement), which is persuasive authority.  
 
3.2 Most significant relationship 
 
According to the most significant relationship test, the rights and liabilities of the parties 
with respect to an issue in tort are governed by the law of the country (or state) which, with 
respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the 
parties.81 In order to establish which country has the most significant relationship, § 145 of 
the Restatement stipulates that a court should take into account the following connecting 
factors: ‘(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing 
the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place 
of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the 
parties is centered’.  
 The place where the injury occurred (cf. Erfolgsort, Article 4(1) Rome II) is thus one 
of the factors which has to be taken into consideration, but it is not decisive in itself. The 
authors of the Restatement have set down that in cases of unfair competition, such as 
misappropriation of trade values or false advertising, the effect of loss of customers or trade 
is pecuniary in nature and will generally be felt at the plaintiff’s principal place of business. 
Consider however, the following sentences:  
 
[464] ‘[T]his place may have only a slight relationship to the defendant’s activities and to the 
plaintiff’s loss of customers or trade. […] For all these reasons, the place of injury does not 
play so important a role for choice-of-law purposes […] as in the case of other kind of torts. 
[…] Instead, the principal location of the defendant’s conduct is the contact that will usually 
be given the greatest weight […].’82  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties has the 
greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation”.’ 
77
 E.g. Eureka Resources, LLC v. Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC, 62 A.3d 1233, 1238 (Del.Super. 2012). 
78
 E.g. Corning Inc. v. SRU Biosystems, LLC, 292 F.Supp.2d 583 (D.Del. 2003). 
79
 Brinkley & West, Inc. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 928 (C.A.5.La. 1974); Marks v. Struble, 347 F.Supp.2d 136 
(D.N.J. 2004). See on ‘content-oriented’ law selection Symeonides 2002, p. 385 ff. (supra n. 73).  
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 See Symeonides 2002, p. 116 ff. (supra n. 73).  
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 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 145. 
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 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 145, comment f.  
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From this, it could83 be concluded that in contract-interference cases the place of the 
conduct has greater weight than the place of damage.84 This is in keeping with the case of 
Grupo Televisa, S.A. v. Telemundo Communications Group, Inc.,85 described in the 
introduction, in which the court of appeals held that Florida had the most significant 
relationship with the dispute, since the alleged tortious conduct (negotiations, signing of a 
second, conflicting agreement) occurred in Florida (Handlungsort). However, the court also 
considered that Florida had a significant interest in deterring tortious interference in Florida, 
since the competition between the parties was centred in Florida (cf. market rule of Art. 6(1) 
Rome II), irrespective of the fact that the contract which had been interfered with, was 
governed by Mexican law.86  
 The court of appeal also held that if the nature of the tort of interference with 
contractual relations is characterised as ‘the misappropriation of trade values’, as was the 
case at the district court, in keeping with the Restatement this means that the place where 
the conduct occurred is the single most important contact to establish the applicable law.87  
 Emphasising the location of the conduct giving rise to the damage is also in line with 
the idea that the tort of interference with contract is viewed as primarily conduct-regulating 
in nature, as opposed to loss-distributing or loss-allocating. Conduct-regulating rules are 
‘territorially orientated’, whereas this is not per se the case for loss-distributing rules. This 
distinction translates into different connecting factors to identify the applicable law. For 
conflicts between conduct-regulating rules, the place of conduct or injury is decisive, 
whereas both territorial and personal (such as the habitual residence of parties) factors are 
important in conflicts between loss-distributing rules.88  
  Although there is much to be said for the Restatement’s view in which considerable 
importance is attached to the Handlungsort, it appears difficult to reconcile with the 
scheme and objectives of the Rome II Regulation. After all, Article 4(1) Rome II refers to the 
lex loci damni, and explicitly states that this law applies, ‘irrespective of the country in which 
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the event giving rise to the damage occurred.’ Recital 16 of the Rome II preamble states that 
this rule ‘strikes a fair balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable and 
the person sustaining the damage, and also reflects the modern approach to civil liability’.  
 A domestic court could, nevertheless, attach particular importance to the 
Handlungsort within the context of Article 4(3) Rome II, and thus consider the country 
where the event giving rise to the damage connected to the tort manifestly more closely. 
Although some have questioned whether the Handlungsort can be taken into account,89 
there seems to be no limitation to the circumstances which can be considered to determine 
whether a manifestly closer connection with another country exists.90   
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The determination of the applicable law in a cross border case of tortious interference with 
contract is far from easy. This paper shows there is no one-size-fits-all solution for all 
contract-interference cases. The analysis above does however offer some guidance as to 
how a court, confronted with this issue, should proceed.  
 Since the (initial) damage resulting from interference with a contract is usually 
pecuniary in nature, it is necessary to establish whether purely economic loss can be 
considered ‘damage’, relevant to establishing the applicable law pursuant to Article 4(1) 
Rome II. This paper argues, also in light of CJEU case law in the context of Article 7(2) 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, that the answer is in the affirmative.  
 Next, the question arises in respect of how to locate the place of damage 
(Erfolgsort). When applying the lex loci damni-rule of Article 4(1) to a contract-interference 
case, the court should examine where the damage, which formed the basis of the claim in 
tort, was actually suffered. Although the victim usually feels the impact of the damage – 
which is mostly pecuniary in nature – at his domicile/his place of business or the location of 
the bank where his account is held, EU case law on Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation indicates that the locus damni should not, in principle, be equated to the victim’s 
domicile and/or bank account location. The place where the inconsistent transaction was 
concluded, should be disregarded because at that particular moment, the damage is not yet 
irreversible. The place where the inconsistent transaction is performed, has to be left out of 
account because it would provide the tortfeasor with an opportunity to manipulate the 
result.  
 According to the prevailing opinion in scholarship, the place of damage in contract-
interference cases should be located at the place where the contractual obligation 
interfered with what ought to have been performed, for instance, where the goods or 
money should have been received in terms of the [465] contract. Although it may be an 
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appropriate criterion for relatively simple transactions, using the place of performance as a 
connecting factor has some significant shortcomings. The place of performance of the 
contractual obligation which has been interfered with may be difficult to determine and/or 
may require the interpretation of the terms of the contract or need to be established on the 
basis of the law applicable to the contract. This appears to be at odds with the objective of 
the Rome II Regulation to improve the predictability of the outcome of litigation,91 
especially from the perspective of the (alleged) tortfeasor, who is not a party to the contract 
which has been interfered with and thus may not be fully aware of all contractual terms. 
Even more importantly, perhaps, the place of performance may be more or less coincidental 
(e.g. a Swiss bank account belonging to a subsidiary), having no real connection with the 
tort. 
 In specific cases, the court will have to determine the Erfolgsort in a different way. 
When, for instance, there is a direct link between the contract-interference and declining 
sales, as in the aforementioned case of the Dutch Court of Appeal concerning exclusive 
distribution,92 the place of damage should be located at the place where the victim’s sales 
were affected, rather than at the place where the contractual obligation should have been 
performed. This solution is also in line with the market-effects rule of Article 6(1) Rome II. 
Although this paper argues that most contract-interference cases will fall under the scope of 
Article 6(2), which refers back to Article 4, there is no contradiction here. Since the rule of 
Article 6(1) should be seen as a clarification of Article 4(1) Rome II, there is no objection to 
applying the market-effects rule to a contract-interference case on the basis of the latter 
provision. In contrast to Article 6(1) however, the exceptions of 4(2) and 4(3) and Article 14 
(choice of law) are not ruled out.  
 Finally, this paper proposes a rather flexible interpretation of the escape clause 
provided in Article 4(3) Rome II. For those contract-interference cases in which the place of 
damage is merely coincidental or difficult to ascertain, the law of the country with the most 
significant connection to the tort should be applied pursuant to Article 4(3) Rome II. This 
may, however, require a broader interpretation of this provision, which is formulated as an 
exception in favour of the ‘manifestly more closely connected law’ in comparison to the law 
applicable pursuant to Article 4(1) or (2) Rome II, implying that the applicable law can be 
determined on the basis of either or both provisions.93 When determining the country with 
which the tort has the most significant connection, the court has to consider all relevant 
factors. In keeping with the prevailing view in the US, it should also attach importance to the 
place of the tortious conduct. The law applicable to the contract interfered with should, 
however, not be given a great importance. After all, the contract interfered with is not a 
‘pre-existing relationship between the parties’ in accordance with Article 4(3) Rome II.  
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